Passkeys vs. Authenticator Push and Codes
Push approvals and Authenticator codes can be relayed by a fake sign-in page. Passkeys can't. What passkeys don't cover, and how to roll them out in Entra ID.

Most Microsoft 365 tenants already use multifactor authentication, usually Microsoft Authenticator push notifications or six-digit codes. That is a real improvement over passwords alone. It isn't the same as phishing-resistant sign-in, though, and Microsoft now draws a clear line between the two. Its Secure Future Initiative guidance says traditional methods such as SMS codes, email one-time passcodes and push notifications "are becoming less effective against today's attackers," and that "phishing-resistant MFA is the new baseline" (Microsoft Learn: Phishing-resistant MFA).
This post explains why push and codes can be phished, which Authenticator options count as phishing-resistant, what passkeys don't cover, and what users and admins can do next.
Why push and codes can be phished
A push approval or a one-time code proves you have your phone. It doesn't prove you're on the real Microsoft sign-in page. Deciding whether the sign-in is genuine is left to the person.
The attack that takes advantage of this is adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing. The user opens a link to a page that looks like the Microsoft sign-in. Behind it, the attacker's server passes what the user types to the real service in real time. The user enters a password and approves the push or types the code, and the real service completes the sign-in. Microsoft describes how this lets an attacker "capture sensitive information such as credentials, session cookies, and other data, even bypassing security measures like multifactor authentication" (Microsoft Learn: Understanding tokens in Microsoft Entra ID).
Microsoft's Essential Eight guidance puts the underlying reason plainly. Citing NIST, it says authenticators that involve manual entry of an output, such as one-time codes, "SHALL NOT be considered verifier impersonation-resistant," because the manual entry doesn't bind the output to the specific session. It concludes that "any authenticator that doesn't cryptographically verify that the sign in server is who it says it is, can be phished" (Microsoft Learn: Essential Eight multifactor authentication).
Number matching helps with a different problem. Microsoft turned it on for all Authenticator push notifications to stop MFA fatigue, where an attacker who already has a password sends repeated prompts hoping someone taps Approve (Microsoft Learn: Protecting authentication methods). It's worth having. It still relies on the user, and push with number matching isn't one of the methods Microsoft counts as phishing-resistant.
Which Authenticator modes are phishing-resistant
The weakness is in how Authenticator is used, not in the app. Authenticator can sign you in several ways, and only the passkey option is phishing-resistant. The list below follows Microsoft's list of phishing-resistant methods (Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra authentication overview) and the methods allowed by the built-in Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength (Microsoft Learn: Authentication strengths).
- Push notification with number matching: not phishing-resistant. The user approves a prompt and enters the number shown on screen.
- One-time code: not phishing-resistant. The user types a six-digit code into the sign-in page.
- Phone sign-in (passwordless): not phishing-resistant. The user approves a prompt without a password. It counts as passwordless MFA, not phishing-resistant MFA.
- Passkey in Microsoft Authenticator: phishing-resistant. The user unlocks it with face, fingerprint or PIN.
Outside Authenticator, Microsoft also lists Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security keys, synced passkeys, Platform Credential for macOS and certificate-based authentication as phishing-resistant.
Why passkeys hold up
A passkey moves the check from the person to the device. Microsoft says passkeys provide "verifier impersonation resistance, which ensures an authenticator only releases secrets to the Relying Party (RP) the passkey was registered with and not an attacker pretending to be that RP" (Microsoft Learn: Passkeys (FIDO2)). The same page sets out how it works:
- Bound to the real site. The key pair is unique, "so your passkey only works on the website or the app you created it for." A lookalike page gets nothing it can relay.
- No shared secret. The private key stays with the user. The public key is stored with the service the user signs in to.
- A fresh challenge each time. Microsoft Entra ID sends a challenge, the authenticator signs it, and Entra ID checks the signature with the public key before it issues a token.
- The user has to be present. Each sign-in needs the user to unlock the passkey on their device. In Microsoft's words, "Someone can't trick you to sign in on another device that they control."
With no unexpected prompt and no code to read out, push bombing and "read me your code" calls have nothing to work with.
What passkeys don't solve
Passkeys protect the moment of sign-in. Plan for the gaps around it.
- Device code phishing. Microsoft calls device code flow "a high-risk authentication method that can be part of a phishing attack" and recommends "blocking device code flow wherever possible" (Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access authentication flows). In this attack the user signs in on Microsoft's genuine page, so binding the passkey to the real site doesn't catch it.
- Token theft by malware. Malware on a device can capture authentication tokens and session cookies after a legitimate sign-in (Microsoft Learn: Understanding tokens). Device hardening, compliant-device Conditional Access and token protection address this (Microsoft Learn: Protecting tokens).
- Weaker fallback methods. Microsoft notes that attackers use "downgrade techniques to bypass stronger protections like passkeys or security keys" (Microsoft Learn: Passkeys (FIDO2)). Registering a passkey helps most once Conditional Access requires a phishing-resistant method.
- Account recovery. If the help desk resets credentials after a phone call, an attacker can skip the passkey. Microsoft points to high-assurance recovery as a way to remove the need for help desk resets and the social engineering risk that comes with them (Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra authentication overview).
- Consent phishing. These attacks trick users into granting permissions to a malicious app, which doesn't depend on how they signed in (Microsoft Learn: Protect against consent phishing). User consent settings are the control here.
What users can do
- Register a passkey at Security info (mysignins.microsoft.com/security-info) by choosing Add sign-in method, then Passkey or Passkey in Microsoft Authenticator, where your organization allows it (Microsoft Support: Create and save a passkey). Passkeys in Authenticator need iOS 17 or later or Android 14 or later (Microsoft Learn: Passkeys in Authenticator).
- Keep a second method registered. Microsoft recommends at least two, such as a passkey plus Windows Hello for Business on your workstation (Microsoft Learn: Plan a phishing-resistant passwordless deployment).
- Don't approve a prompt you didn't start, don't read a code to anyone, and only enter a device code if you started that sign-in yourself. Report unexpected prompts or calls to IT.
What admins can do in Microsoft Entra ID
- Enable passkeys. Turn on Passkey (FIDO2) in Authentication methods and set up passkey profiles, including passkeys in Microsoft Authenticator (Microsoft Learn: Enable passkeys (FIDO2)).
- Start a report-only policy early. Microsoft suggests a Conditional Access policy for all users, excluding break-glass accounts, on all resources, with the grant control set to the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength and the policy in report-only mode. That shows who would be blocked before you enforce anything (Microsoft Learn: Plan a phishing-resistant passwordless deployment).
- Enforce in waves. Microsoft typically suggests piloting with admins first, then moving to wider groups by device platform, and slowing down if help desk volume rises (same source).
- Onboard and recover with a Temporary Access Pass. A TAP is a time-limited passcode that lets users register passwordless methods and makes recovery easier (Microsoft Learn: Temporary Access Pass). Microsoft pairs it with identity verification for new users.
- Restrict device code flow in Conditional Access except where there's a documented need (Microsoft Learn: Authentication flows).
None of this has to happen at once. Microsoft's own advice is "don't let perfect be the enemy of good": get phishing-resistant credentials to as many users as you can, starting with the people who have the most access.
Plan your move to passkeys
If you'd like help working out which users and devices are ready, setting up a report-only policy, or planning enforcement waves, we can help. Plan your move to passkeys.
Sources
- Phishing-resistant MFA (Secure Future Initiative)
- Microsoft Entra authentication overview
- Passkeys (FIDO2) authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID
- Overview of Conditional Access authentication strengths
- Essential Eight multifactor authentication
- Understanding tokens in Microsoft Entra ID
- Protecting tokens in Microsoft Entra ID
- Protecting authentication methods in Microsoft Entra ID
- Conditional Access: authentication flows
- Protect against consent phishing
- Plan a phishing-resistant passwordless authentication deployment
- Enable passkeys (FIDO2) in Microsoft Entra ID
- Enable passkeys in Authenticator
- Temporary Access Pass
- Create and save a passkey (Microsoft Support)
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